It was a Manchester derby to forget for Ruben Amorim. His Manchester United suffered a 3-0 defeat at the Etihad. The loss means the Portuguese coach now has eight wins from 31 Premier League games.
The question remains: was this result down to Amorim’s philosophy, costly mistakes, or simply City’s brilliance? We analyse how the game was won and lost, with focus on both teams’ tactics.
How City built a four against two in midfield
City concentrated much of their first-half play down the left. Pep Guardiola designed a plan to exploit United’s defensive set-up. His idea targeted their back five, the two central midfielders, and the pressing role of the wide centre-backs.
Nico O’Reilly stayed wide on the touchline, dragging wing-back Noussair Mazraoui with him. Normally, Mazraoui would have tracked Jeremy Doku. But with O’Reilly wide, Doku moved central, leaving Mazraoui unsure. He chose to cover the wide space instead, pressing O’Reilly.
Doku’s positioning created an overload around United’s midfield. With Rodri, Phil Foden dropping deeper, Doku inside, and Tijjani Reijnders, City formed a box around United’s two midfielders. Fulham used this tactic earlier in the season with Alex Iwobi drifting inside to overwhelm United’s midfield.
United’s press falls apart
With Doku moving inside, centre-back Leny Yoro had to step forward and track him. That is a hard task for a central defender, especially as Doku dropped deep, sometimes into his own half. Foden also moved into that space, stretching Yoro further.
Yoro’s aggressive defending sometimes turned the battle into a four against three. But often, he retreated to avoid losing connection with his backline. That hesitation left gaps in United’s press. City always had one free player to receive the ball.
Bruno Fernandes admitted after the game that United lacked bravery. He called for “full pressure” to stop City’s rhythm. He explained how he pressed Rodri while Yoro was meant to cover Foden. Miscommunication left both players free, and City used the space.
A committed man-to-man press could have reduced City’s options. Instead, Foden frequently received the ball unchallenged and drove forward. The same pattern reappeared later in the game, exposing United’s weak structure.
City’s clever use of pinning
Guardiola’s side used pinning to weaken United’s defence. Pinning means forcing a defender to stay in one area because of an attacker’s position. If the defender leaves, the attacker becomes free.
O’Reilly pinned Mazraoui wide, which allowed Doku to move inside untracked. On the opposite flank, Reijnders stayed close to Luke Shaw, preventing him from stepping forward. This gave Doku time and space when he collected the ball inside.
Amorim’s system expects wide centre-backs to step up when outnumbered in midfield. But Shaw stayed with Reijnders, leaving Doku unmarked. Doku had time to turn, run, and set up City’s opening goal.
United’s midfielders miss runners
For City’s first goal, Fernandes and Manuel Ugarte had dropped deep. Still, City collected the loose ball in the box without pressure. Late runs into the penalty area punished United once again.
Last month, Fulham’s Emile Smith Rowe scored in the same fashion. On Sunday, Foden’s goal came because Fernandes failed to track the run. Fernandes offers energy, passing, and vision, but defensive awareness is not his strength.
Guardiola, by contrast, used Foden’s timing intelligently. Playing him behind Erling Haaland gave City another weapon. It was a calculated move that made the difference.
Should managers adapt their system?
The debate after the game focused on Amorim’s system versus his players. Better personnel might help, but United’s problems run deeper. Opponents have repeatedly overloaded their midfield by rotating positions. Fulham did it. City did it again on Sunday.
Fans worry when a manager refuses to adapt. Amorim insists he will not change his philosophy. He said: “When I want to change my philosophy, I will change. If not, you have to change the man.”
But United’s squad cannot change until January. Amorim may need to adapt roles or tweak his system. Guardiola, however, showed once more his flexibility. He used new goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma to play more direct from the back.
That approach is unusual for a Guardiola team, but it underlines his willingness to adapt. He stays true to his philosophy while adjusting details to maximise his players’ strengths and hide weaknesses.
